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Wells Fargo & Co.’s Community Banking unit had enjoyed a strong, positive reputation for decades. Wells Fargo, as a whole, 
had avoided most of the problems of the 2008 financial crisis, only to stumble into its own crisis in late 2016. The Community 
Banking unit was accused of opening millions of unauthorized accounts, firing employees for violating policy without addressing 
the root causes of those violations, and failing to detect and prevent these sorts of issues before they became widespread. Impact 
on consumers was widely varied, from new checking accounts that sometimes caused no significant impact, to new credit 
accounts that generated fees and caused negative impacts on consumer credit scores. How did the bank’s approach to information 
management contribute to this problem? What could the bank have done differently to detect, respond to, and prevent future 
instances of improper account opening? What does the bank need to do going forward to prevent future problems and regain 
customer trust? 
 





Another key gauge of how we are satisfying the needs 
of our customers is how many products they have with 
us. In fourth quarter 2013, the average Retail Bank 
household had 6.16 Wells Fargo products, up from 
6.05 in fourth quarter 2012. (Wells Fargo, 2014, p. 7) 
 
Wells Fargo Corporation CEO John Stumpf was often 
cited as using the slogan “eight is great,” encouraging 
employees to get the average customer “product” count for a 
customer to eight (Garrett, 2016). “Products” in the Wells 
Fargo culture referred to all types of banking and credit 
accounts, as well as other services. More products translated 
into more information about the customer, which would in 
turn lead to higher profitability.  
Wells Fargo Corporation is a large U.S.-based banking 
company with operations in consumer, business, and 
investment banking. Their branch banking operation (the 
“Community Bank”) has branches in over 35 states and, 
through the years 2010-2015, was one of the engines of 
perceived growth for the company. One of the key metrics that 
Wells Fargo tracked and reported was “products per 
household,” which they used as a way of tracking the breadth 
of their relationship with their customers. To help drive 
growth of this number, for each of its branch employees, 
Wells Fargo tracked the number of new “products” that person 
opened for their customers, including ATM cards, savings and 
checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, etc. Incentives and 
disincentives were tied to how well these branch employees 
performed in relation to their new product sales goals 
(Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017). 
It’s reasonable to ask, if profitability is the fundamental 
goal, why were Wells Fargo employees not directly measured 
on customer profitability? This question will be explored later 
in this case study. It’s also a good practice to ensure that 
metrics and incentives are properly aligned with corporate 
goals. Kerr (1995) notes that incenting particular behaviors, 
while expecting different behaviors, is both common and 
dangerous.  
Wells  Fargo’s  organization  structure, particularly related 
to  the  Community  Bank,  is  shown  in  Figure 1.   Note  that 
 
Figure 1. Wells Fargo Organization Chart 
(Wells Fargo Reports, as of September 2016) 
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the Community Bank had its own auditing and risk 
management units. Those had solid line (direct) reporting 
relationships to the head of the Community Bank and dotted 
line (indirect) relationships to their respective corporate units.  
The long-term impact of this scandal is not yet clear. 
Immediate impacts included lower traffic in the bank’s 
branches and fewer new accounts and deposits from 
consumers. And, at least in the short term, large organizations 
have pulled their business from Wells Fargo’s corporate 
banking division. These include the states of California and 
Illinois, who froze their business dealings with the bank 
(Glazer, 2016). Some cities have also reduced or eliminated 
their business ties to Wells Fargo, in part because of the new 
account scandal, but also due to other concerns such as 
funding for socially unfavorable projects (Chappell, 2017). 
Scandals don’t often appear overnight. John Stumpf’s 
predecessor created the phrase “eight is great,” doubling the 
number of products per customer that the bank hoped to sell 
(McLean, 1998). The “Jump into January” sales campaign, 
which particularly ramped up pressure in the first month of 
each year, started in 2003. Significant volumes of “bad 
behavior” didn’t start surfacing until 2011, and the scandal 
itself became fully public in 2016 (Independent Directors – 
Wells Fargo, 2017). 
In addition to published reports, this case study includes 
comments from three former Wells Fargo employees (names 
changed): 
 
• Lawrence, a teller with the Community Bank for five 
months in 2015 
• Bernie, who started as a teller and became a branch 
manager for over five years starting in 2009 
• Sam, an information technology executive with two 
different banking units over an eight year period 
 
All three shared their perspectives based on the published 
reports and their own experiences. All had left Wells Fargo 
before the story became public, and each separately expressed 
surprise that it had taken so long for the scandal to become 
public. 
 
2. TECHNICAL AND BUSINESS BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Key Terms 
Key terms relevant to the case include banking, cross-selling, 
profitability, culture, ethics, incentives, risk, and metrics. 
Understanding these terms is important to grasping the impact 
of information and of decisions made by the various 
participants in these situations. 
Banking: The banking industry is responsible for a variety 
of financial management functions, most fundamentally 
including taking deposits from customers for safe-keeping and 
earning interest and making loans to customers to support 
those customers’ financial needs (Investopedia.com, N.D.). 
Cross-selling: The process of leveraging an existing 
relationship with a customer to attempt to provide that 
customer with additional goods and services. In banking, that 
often means opening additional accounts or providing 
additional services, like ATM cards, online banking, or 
financial planning (Investopedia.com, N.D.). 
 
Profitability: At a corporate level, this refers to the overall 
balance between income and expenses. At the individual 
customer and business unit levels, profitability attempts to 
capture the same principle, but reflects the necessity in some 
cases to estimate the actual income and expense that are 
attributable to a specific customer or business unit 
(Investopedia.com, N.D.). 
Metrics: These are measurable values pertaining to 
business operations that can be counted and reported on a 
monthly, weekly, daily, and even continuous basis. The 
objective of capturing and reporting metrics is usually to help 
the organization focus on accomplishing goals that its 
management has deemed to be important to achieve, including 
high-level goals of revenue and profitability, as well as finer-
grained goals related to things like customer service, sales 
results, etc. (Investopedia.com, N.D.) 
Culture: Corporate culture refers to the beliefs, values, and 
behaviors that govern how employees of a company interact 
with each other and with outsiders, including customers and 
suppliers. Sometimes this is explicitly documented; more 
often at least some aspects of a corporate culture are tacitly 
defined, but not explicitly documented (Tayan, 2016).  
Ethics: A system of moral and social principles that in 
business are used to guide interactions among employees and 
between employees and other stakeholders, such as customers 
(Investopedia.com, N.D.).   
Incentives: In managing employee behavior, incentives are 
often used to encourage or discourage particular behaviors or 
results. Done well, incentives support positive aspects of 
corporate culture and encourage behaviors that lead to positive 
business outcomes (Kerr, 1995).  
Risk and risk management: Risk refers to the uncertainty 
of various events happening – both good and bad. Most 
commonly, risk management focuses on “downside” risk – the 
risk that unfavorable events or results will take place. In 
banking, this takes a number of forms – risk of fraud, risk of 
borrowers not paying back a loan, etc. Risk management 
includes the tasks of identifying risks, estimating probabilities 
of occurrence, and determining likely impacts. It also includes 
the function of identifying and assessing steps that might 
mitigate either the risk of occurrence or of the impact 
(Investopedia.com, N.D.). 
 
2.2 Rationale for Product Sales Goals 
Sam, the IT executive, said that Wells Fargo had an intense 
corporate focus on sales and especially cross-selling, referring 
to that as Wells Fargo’s “sacred cow.” He pointed out that 
even the IT organizations were part of the process, as the IT 
systems were required to capture and report sales-related 
metrics. 
The Community Bank had a somewhat arbitrary goal of 
eight products per customer. (For the purposes of this case 
study, products and accounts are used somewhat 
interchangeably, with products being a more general term that 
includes ATM cards, online banking, and other services.) The 
rationale for this target is shown in Figures 2 and 3, below.  
Figure 2 indicates that the propensity of customers to add 
new products goes up the more products they have. So more 
products are a self-sustaining path – if customers join the bank 
and can be persuaded to add more products, that increases the 
chances that they’ll add even more products in the future 
(Tayan, 2016).  
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Figure 2. Products per Customer vs. Future Purchases 
(Tayan, 2016, p. 8) 
 
But in the larger picture, why are more products a good 
thing? It appears that customers with more products are more 
profitable to the bank, as shown in Figure 3. The base level of 
profitability, a customer with three products, is profitable to a 
certain extent. A customer with five products, though, is 
believed to be three times more profitable than the three-
product customer.  
There are many reasons for this effect. For example, 
customers with more accounts tend to be “stickier” and stay 
with the bank longer, so the bank doesn’t need to spend 
marketing dollars to replace them. In addition, customers with 
more products tend to give the bank a higher “share of wallet” 
so that the bank can earn additional revenue on those deposits 
or loans (Witman and Roust, 2008). Finally, the additional 
information provided by the products gives the bank better 
information with which to make decisions on how to interact 
with the customer.  
 
 
Figure 3. Retail Banking Profit per Customer 
(Tayan, 2016, p. 8) 
3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
 
3.1 The Scandal Becomes Public 
In September of 2016, it was revealed that Wells Fargo 
employees had been systematically opening new accounts that 
customers had not authorized. In many cases, the accounts 
were opened and then closed a few days later, but often the 
accounts stayed open for weeks or months, and often without 
the customer’s knowledge. Wells Fargo announced a 
settlement with two federal financial regulatory agencies and 
the City of Los Angeles and agreed to a penalty of US$185 
million. 
This practice of creating accounts to meet key metrics 
conflicted with systems that the bank itself had put in place to 
prevent this type of issue:  
 
• Customers were to be notified when new accounts 
were opened for them.  
o In many cases, employees would modify the 
notification address and phone information so that 
the customer would not be alerted. 
• New deposit accounts needed to have funds deposited 
into them for the accounts to stay active.  
o Employees would often move funds to those 
accounts temporarily, then move the money back. 
Many customers didn’t notice the opening of the 
accounts or the funds movement on their 
statements. This was a practice known as 
“simulated funding.”  
• Auditors reviewed new accounts periodically. 
o However, access to records by corporate-level 
auditors was limited by the Community Bank 
management.  
 
The bank also had systems in place to measure results, 
often in terms of new accounts opened, at the staff member, 
branch, and regional levels. And while simply measuring and 
reporting results can affect behavior, Wells Fargo also had 
strong management motivations in place aimed at reinforcing 
the task of meeting or exceeding the metrics. The metrics were 
deliberately tough to meet, referred to as “50-50” goals, with 
senior managers expecting that only 50% of branches would 
be able to meet the goals. 
Bernie, the former branch manager, said that his branch 
goals were clearly tough to meet – the goals had been set 
based on prior year results, which included a one-time 
increase in branch activity. In addition, each of his two 
personal bankers (a rank above teller) had a goal of 8 product 
sales per day, but the branch’s goal was for 25 sales per day – 
9 more than his two personal bankers were expected to 
produce. When he asked, he was told to “figure it out” – meet 
the numbers “without regard” to other considerations. 
Individual personal bankers were assessed by their 
managers, usually several times per day, on how many 
accounts they had opened that day, that week, and that month. 
Lawrence said that tellers were measured on their compliance 
with scripted talking points and metrics for referrals for 
product sales. Their results were compared to their individual 
goals and their contribution to the branch’s goals. Meeting or 
exceeding goals might be rewarded with cash incentives of 
$250-800. But failing to meet goals was often met with 
threatened and actual penalties – demotion and termination 
among them, primarily for personal bankers (the lowest-level 
staff), but also for branch managers and others up the 
management chain.  
Measurement and incentive programs continued up the 
organization chart to include the branch and regional 
management teams. They would have weekly, sometimes 
daily, conference calls to check on results, and it was 
important to the managers to have good numbers to report. 
Further up the organizational chain, though, at the senior 
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management levels, incentives were tied less to the immediate 
achievements and more toward longer-term results. 
 
3.1.1 Ethics rules: The bank had ethics rules in place that 
could and should have prevented the actions in this scandal 
(Tayan, 2016). Indeed, the first statements from the CEO, 
John Stumpf, just days after the scandal broke in September 
2016, indicated that the problem was employees who didn’t 
live up to the bank’s culture and ethical standards: “if they're 
not going to do the thing that we ask them to do – put 
customers first, honor our vision and values – I don't want 
them here” (Glazer and Rexnode, 2016).  
In addition to the bank’s ethical standards (their Code of 
Ethics and Business Conduct), the bank provided a hotline for 
employees to call to report ethical concerns. The company’s 
2015 annual report notes that “We require all team members 
to adhere to the highest standards of ethics and business 
conduct” (Wells Fargo, 2015), and employees are encouraged 
to call the EthicsLine anonymous tip line to report suspected 
ethical violations (Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 
2017). Bernie’s experience flew in the face of this statement; 
he said that his experiences with Human Resources led him to 
believe that HR leaned more toward meeting the goals than 
doing it ethically. 
 
3.1.2 Egregious abuses: Between 2011 and 2016, Wells 
Fargo terminated many people for failing to meet goals 
(amounting to 1% of its workforce every year). Wells Fargo 
terminated an additional 5,300 of its 110,000+ employees for 
abusing the account opening process. In addition, in some 
cases it is alleged to have terminated (often on fake charges) 
and “blacklisted” employees from the financial industry if the 
employee had complained about the sales goals or made 
allegations of improper conduct (Associated Press, 2017). Yet 
it did not change the fundamental measurements that seem 
likely to have triggered the misbehavior by those employees.  
 
3.1.3 Business value: Wells Fargo, as part of its annual 
reports, told its shareholders that having many accounts with 
each household would ensure that it would be the “primary” 
bank for that household, and thus have a strong and long-
lasting relationship. In many cases, though, because so many 
of these accounts and products (a total of at least 3.5 million 
new accounts over 6 years (Stempel, 2017)) were never used, 
and often charged no fees, the bank found itself spending staff 
time to open the account, to cover up the opening, to fund the 
account, and perhaps later to close the account. And if a 
customer noticed an issue and complained, bank staff would 
spend time to resolve the issue and perhaps compensate the 
customer by reimbursing any fees paid.  
Bernie recounted a conversation with a state-level 
executive who touted the sales of over 1 million products 
during a particular reporting period, and that about 250,000 
were still open at the end of that period. This indicates that 
around 75% of the products sold had not been kept by the 
customers.  
The net effect of these fraudulently opened products was 
generally not a financial gain for the bank, but merely a win 
for staff metrics and shareholder reporting. The reported total 
fees claimed by the bank related to these fraudulent accounts 
was only $2.6 million. Even the credit card accounts, which 
often had fees associated with them, were worth relatively 
little revenue to the bank if the consumer did not actively use 
the card. As a result, the bank’s incentive system seems to 
have provoked behavior that was not beneficial to any of its 
stakeholders – customers, employees, management, or 
shareholders.  
 
3.2 Elements of the Scandal 
3.2.1 Sales pressure: Branch staff, both tellers and personal 
bankers, many of whom earned near the minimum wage, were 
often under significant pressure to “sell” products – to open 
new accounts or provide new services. This pressure came not 
just in the form of the potential for earning incentives, but also 
in pressure from managers to produce or risk losing their jobs.  
All branch staff, and particularly personal bankers, were 
viewed to a great extent by the bank as sales people, 
responsible for “selling” a certain volume of new products in a 
particular time period. Branch, district, and regional managers 
would often hold conference calls on a daily or more-frequent 
basis to check on the progress against that day’s goals, 
increasing pressure on the line employees.  
As an example, one Wells Fargo customer had two 
accounts opened, one for each of his two great-grandchildren. 
Some years later, the account owner discovered a total of 
twelve accounts, rather than the original two, with ten of the 
accounts empty and dormant.  
Not surprisingly, competition even without explicit 
incentives can be a strong motivator. Shelley Freeman was the 
Lead Regional President for Florida from 2009-2013. She 
went a step further to add pressure, routinely exhorting her 
staff to do better by calling out her region’s performance 
relative to the other regions, and encouraging them to do what 
it takes to be ranked first among the Wells Fargo regions.  
 
• Why would something as simple as a conference call 
be perceived as raising pressure on staff, particularly 
to do things that are disallowed by the corporate ethics 
policies?  
• How could senior managers better balance the 
importance of meeting sales goals with the importance 
of doing quality work and meeting ethical standards? 
 
3.2.2 Employee turnover rates: One common indication of 
an organization’s health is the rate of staff turnover – how 
many employees are leaving an organization in a given period 
of time. Employee departures can be for a number of reasons: 
resignations, firings for failure to meet quotas, firings for 
failure to comply with ethics rules, geographic moves, staffing 
level adjustment, and others. Most critical in this case is the 
number of staff departures due to resignations and due to 
failure to meet quotas or to comply with ethics rules.  
Bernie commented on the high turnover rate as a common 
phenomenon at Wells Fargo. He also noted that turnover 
allowed his rapid ascent in the organization – from teller to 
service manager in just 18 months.  
When the scandal became public in 2016, Wells Fargo 
reported that over 5,300 employees had been terminated for 
failure to comply with corporate ethics rules (specifically, 
customer consent requirements). Only nine of these 
terminations were for management staff above the branch 
manager level. The rates of these types of terminations varied 
by region, with California, Arizona, and Florida ranking 
highest in terms of numbers of allegations of violations and in 
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terms of numbers of resignations or terminations due to those 
violations. Wells Fargo recorded information about the stated 
reason for each departure so that it had a way to count how 
many departures were related to ethics issues or to failure to 
perform up to standards.  
 
• When do employee departures represent a problem for 
a company? What criteria could have enabled Wells 
Fargo to detect this symptom of the problem and see 
the bigger issue it represented?  
• If you were in charge of Human Resources at Wells 
Fargo, what type of data would you want to be 
reported so that you could detect this or similar 
problems?  
 
3.2.3 “Jump into January” and 1Q sales goals: In 2003, 
Wells Fargo’s Community Bank created its “Jump into 
January” sales campaign to help start sales off strong in the 
first month of the year. Daily sales targets were set higher in 
January, and management emphasized these higher goals and 
rewarded staff who were able to meet them. Staffers reported 
that they were asked by managers to identify friends and 
family for whom they might open accounts in January. They 
also reported that they frequently “sandbagged” – holding 
back accounts they could have opened in December, so that 
they had more new sales to start with in January (Independent 
Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017, p. 21). 
Senior managers at the bank observed the risk that the 
Jump program created in adding more sales pressure to the 
first month of the year. However, Division President Carrie 
Tolstedt was reluctant to end the program because she was 
“scared to death” that such a change would impact sales 
throughout the year (Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 
2017, p. 25). Instead, in 2013, she replaced Jump into January 
with a new program called “Accelerate,” which ostensibly 
focused more on customer experience and spread the 
measurement out beyond January to the first three months of 
the year. However, some employees viewed “Accelerate” as 
more of a name change and a longer time span, but no real 
change in direction or methods from “Jump.” 
 
• Is sandbagging a problem in and of itself? Does the act 
of moving a legitimate sale from one month to another 
constitute a problem? Why or why not? 
• Are there advantages to starting off a measurement 
period with strong numbers? How could the advantage 
of a strong start help to manage performance 
throughout the entire time period? Are there 
disadvantages as well?  
• What could the bank have done instead to start the 
year off strong without creating undue sales pressure?  
 
3.2.4 Selling to family members and staff: Many Wells 
Fargo staff members, in the push to meet daily quotas, would 
often open accounts in the name of friends or family members. 
As noted previously, idle accounts often had little direct and 
immediate impact on the account holder, as long as there were 
no fees. As one example, cited by the board’s investigative 
report, “a branch manager had a teenage daughter with 24 
accounts, an adult daughter with 18 accounts, a husband with 
21 accounts, a brother with 14 accounts, and a father with 4 
accounts” (Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017, p. 36). 
This highlights the pressure not just on line employees, but on 
managers as well.  
Both Bernie and Lawrence reported accounts being 
opened for them without their consent. Lawrence had four 
unauthorized accounts, including a credit card, before he left 
the bank after five months. The credit card was intercepted or 
sent to an incorrect address, as he never received it. Bernie had 
five products, including credit protection services with a 
monthly fee. He noticed that each month a personal banker 
would manually credit the monthly fee back to his account.  
The relatively higher targets of the “Jump into January” 
campaign seemed to provoke some of this behavior, with 
employees stating that they were asked to identify friends and 
family for whom they could open accounts as soon as January 
began. In addition, friends and family were a relatively easy 
sales target for many employees throughout the year. It was 
also alleged that at least one district-level manager taught 
employees how to hide the family relationship in the online 
systems that the bank used to try to detect such activity.  
 
• Was this behavior really “wrong”? What if the family 
members agreed to these new accounts? Does it 
violate reasonable ethical standards?  
• What additional controls could Wells Fargo have used 
to detect and respond to family-based account 
openings? 
• What characteristics of the new product sales metric 
provoked selling to family and friends? 
 
3.2.5 Selling to vulnerable populations: Part of the role of a 
regulatory system is to protect vulnerable members of society 
from abuses by powerful entities, like corporations. In 
incenting its staff to open accounts to protect their own jobs 
(and management’s), Wells Fargo arguably triggered 
behaviors that were particularly egregious. Wells Fargo staff 
reportedly went beyond opening accounts for family members. 
In many cases, they “sold” an account as requiring a different 
type of account to go with it, or added additional accounts to a 
new customer’s records after the customer had left the bank 
office. Often, this behavior took place with customers who 
were not native English speakers or who were elderly. Some 
of these new accounts were “harmless” – no fees or direct 
impact to customers. But multiple accounts, particularly 
unused credit lines, can have a negative impact on a credit 
report and can be an avenue for fraud and other risks 
(MyFICO.com, N.D.).  
At some branches, Wells Fargo employees reported that 
they would routinely go out to locations frequented by day 
laborers and pay each of them a small sum to come back to the 
bank branch and open accounts (Payne, 2017). The laborers 
often spoke little English and did not understand what they 
were signing up for. In many cases, this exposed the laborers 
to monthly or annual fees and other obligations to the bank. If 
the laborers were undocumented, this could also have 
increased their immigration enforcement risk.  
 
• What information could Wells Fargo have captured 
(or would you expect it already had) that could have 
helped it to detect this issue? 
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3.2.6 Funding rates: Numbers of new accounts were one 
target metric, but Wells Fargo seemed to have recognized that 
an empty or unused account was likely not a particularly 
profitable one. The bank had controls and metrics in place that 
periodically measured what they called the “funding rate” – 
the percentage of new accounts that showed some evidence of 
being used by their owners. Most commonly, for deposit 
accounts, this was measured by the percentage of accounts 
that had money moved or deposited into them and for that 
money to remain there for a period of time (Independent 
Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017, p. 21).  
There are certainly reasons why a customer might open an 
account and then not fund or otherwise use it. The bank might 
have offered an incentive of some sort to open the account or 
the account might have been created for a future need. 
However, the bank used this metric, across the bank and by 
region, to assess the “quality” of its sales. Lower funding rates 
generally indicated lower quality of sales.  
The bank noticed that its funding rate was significantly 
lower in some parts of the country than in others, and that the 
funding rates had declined over time, even as far back as 2012. 
Bank staff were also reported to have “simulated” funding of 
an account by moving funds from another of the customer’s 
accounts for a short period of time, and then moving the 
money back.  
 
• What metrics might be applied to other “products” to 
ensure that they were being used? Consider products 
like ATM cards, debit cards, and credit cards?  
• How could the bank have detected these “simulated 
funding” incidents? 
• How could the bank have responded to the reduced 
funding rate? 
 
3.2.7 Metrics tracking and changes: Based on its 
fundamental target of eight products per customer, Wells 
Fargo relied on the relatively simple target metric of counting 
the total number of products sold to each customer, averaged 
over the customer base. This metric was advanced by 
encouraging new sales of products to existing customers on 
the assumption that additional products would bring the bank 
more information about each customer as well as a larger 
“share of wallet” (proportion of the customer’s total banking 
business).  
While these metrics worked for several years (at least 
1998 to the mid-2000s), the evidence that they began to break 
down started to appear in 2005. More serious issues became 
visible in specific regions with particularly strong pushing of 
the sales goals. Ultimately, the scandal emerged with the 
revelation of millions of unauthorized accounts and thousands 
of employees fired for improper activity, with many more 
fired for failing to meet sales goals or, allegedly, for raising 
ethical concerns.  
Wells Fargo measured not just product sales, but also tried 
to incorporate some assessment of product profitability. For 
example, Bernie noted that a home equity line of credit 
(HELOC) counted for a much higher score than a standard 
checking account. He also noted that he had observed personal 
bankers selling HELOC accounts to people who had very 
recently bought homes. The home would likely have little 
accumulated equity, and the account would likely be closed 
soon after, but the banker got “credit” for the HELOC sale.  
In January of 2017, Wells Fargo announced their new 
metrics and incentives program which eliminated specific 
sales quotas. The incentives also focused on customer 
satisfaction, was more team-based (at least for entry-level 
staff), and carried more of an oversight function to ensure 
proper behavior. Wells Fargo hoped that this new incentive 
program would encourage the correct behaviors while 
discouraging the bad behaviors that precipitated the scandal. 
 
 
Figure 4. Wells Fargo Incentive Metrics Compared 
(Wells Fargo, 2017) 
 
• What was wrong with just measuring sales and also 
holding employees to a high ethical standard?  
• Do you think the immediacy of the prior incentive 
system (immediate credit for each sale) contributed to 
the problems? What value does it add to delay the 
recognition of a sale? What risks does that delay add? 
• What do you think about Wells Fargo’s new metrics? 
What are the pros and cons of these new metrics 
relative to the corporate goals of high ethical standards 
AND high profitability?  
 
3.2.8 Bypassing customer controls: Most banks have 
controls in place to help prevent fraud of all types, both 
internally- and externally-generated. Often, this includes 
automatic notification to customers of changes in their 
accounts or other services. But here again, Wells Fargo staff 
appear to have found ways around these controls. In some 
cases, they were reported to have used the e-mail address 
“noname@wellsfargo.com” to sign a customer up for online 
banking services (Egan, 2017). Many banks also notify 
customers of changes via e-mail and/or via paper mail to their 
home addresses.  
 
• What data could Wells Fargo have examined to 
identify potentially false or misleading e-mail 
addresses or other notifications?  
• Thinking unethically for a moment, if your employer 
did notify customers of changes in their accounts, how 
could you prevent the customer from being aware of 
the change? 
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3.2.9 Audits and information access: Like all banks, Wells 
Fargo has a number of internal audit and risk management 
functions. In most cases, those departments report to 
executives in the corporate management structure, as well as 
to their respective committees on the Board of Directors. As 
shown in Figure 1, the Community Banking division had both 
an Audit and a Risk Management function. Each reported 
directly to the President of the Community Bank, and 
indirectly to their respective units in the corporate office. The 
corporate risk and audit leaders then reported to the board, 
giving the Community Bank stronger control of the raw data 
that eventually was seen by the board. This was an 
organizational decision that Wells Fargo made, and it carried 
both pros and cons with it.  
The Chief Operational Risk Officer for the corporation, 
Caryl Athanasiu, did not view compensation issues or sales 
practices as her responsibility. She took a somewhat narrower 
view of risk, focusing on creating risk management programs 
and supporting individual business units only in the event of 
serious breakdowns. This obviously did not include the 
unforeseen reputational risk that the scandal ultimately 
produced (Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017, p. 61). 
In some cases, the Community Bank units leveraged that 
stronger control to remove information from reports to the 
Board. For example, in 2013, Claudia Russ Anderson, 
Community Banking Risk Officer, was able to convince Chief 
Risk Officer Michael Loughlin to exclude information about 
sales practices from a board report. Russ Anderson claimed 
that the report as written made the problem seem “so much 
worse than it is” (Independent Directors – Wells Fargo, 2017).  
 
• Why is control of information flow fundamental to the 
problems that Wells Fargo experienced? 
 
4. CLOSING QUESTIONS 
 
The following questions are provided to spark additional 
thought and research into the information flows and 
management inside Wells Fargo. We hope to also invite 
consideration into how to use information more effectively to 
manage organizations, incentivize the right behavior, and 
detect inappropriate behavior in a timely manner.  
 
• Why would the bank choose to measure its 
employees’ performance based on products per 
customer rather than measuring performance more 
directly on customer balances and profitability?  
• How would you propose measuring the profitability of 
a particular customer? What data would you need to 
track? Think broadly! Could you measure the 
profitability impact of staff interactions with the 
customer? How?  
• What information could Wells Fargo have used to 
resolve this issue before it was subject to a $185 
million penalty?  
• If you were running the Wells Fargo Community 
Bank, what results would you measure to ensure 
against such problems while still pushing for 
profitability? 
• What ethical dilemmas did Wells Fargo create in their 
staff through their original measurement and incentive 
plan?  
• What were some of the business (e.g., financial, 
management, marketing) failings of this measurement 
and incentive plan?  
• If you view the raw measurements of “new accounts” 
or “new products” as pieces of data, what must be 
done to turn that data into actionable information, on 
which Wells Fargo can make informed decisions? 
 
The following questions may require additional research: 
 
• Did the employees have to undergo periodic ethical 
training? 
• When employees called the EthicsLine to report 
ethical violations, what happened? 
• When employees were fired for opening too few 
accounts, was there a fair process for this? Did 
employees sometimes complain that perhaps there 
were other issues involved? Were there any long-term 
impacts on those employees? 
• Is it possible that firing some employees for failing to 
meet goals was done deliberately to create even more 
sales pressure? Or was the additional pressure an 




This case study provides a detailed look at the information 
gathered and used in a real-world business setting. The 
behaviors of bank employees and managers can be examined 
in ways that help to understand how corporate culture can 
change over time, and how information management can 
contribute to that. It can also help to understand how the right 
metrics (data to gather), coupled with reporting and 
monitoring those metrics over time (turning that data into 
information), are critical to achieving and sustaining business 
results.  
We encourage you to analyze each of the components of 
this case, to understand what could have gone wrong, and to 
identify ways to improve the likely outcome. No one is 
immune from making imperfect decisions, so it is important to 
understand how we are asking employees to make decisions, 
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